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This Executive Summary summarizes a proposal (the “Proposal”) described in a 
Special Report, titled “CBIT 2.0,” that is scheduled to appear on Aug. 26, 2013, in the 
trade publication Tax Notes (the “Special Report”). The Proposal advocates adoption of 
an updated version of the comprehensive business income tax, or CBIT, in place of 
current taxes on business income. 
The Treasury Department first proposed the CBIT in 1992.1  In Treasury’s 
version, which it developed as part of its report on the integration of the corporate and 
individual tax bases (the “Treasury Report”), the CBIT would be levied at a flat, 31 
percent rate, which equaled the then-maximum rate on individual income. Taxes on 
distributions would be eliminated, including on interest payments from CBIT-covered 
entities. Correlatively, interest paid by CBIT entities would generally be non-deductible. 
The CBIT would apply not only to corporations, but also to partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. 
When the Treasury Report was published, the maximum rate on corporate 
income was 34 percent. By pegging the CBIT rate to the then-maximum individual rate 
and eliminating taxes on distributions, tax-motivated decisions to retain or distribute 
entity-level earnings would be eliminated. By treating debt and equity equally, the tax 
bias in favor of debt financing would be eliminated. And by subjecting all business 
income to the same, single level of tax, the tax bias against conducting business in the 
corporate form would be eliminated. In Treasury’s calculations, these benefits, together 
with the repeal of most business tax expenditures, would result in a tax that was 
approximately revenue-neutral when compared with existing law, despite the loss of tax 
revenue from dividend distributions and from the sale or exchange of interests in CBIT 
entities, and despite the reduction in the top corporate rate from 34 to 31 percent. 
Since 1992, a number of changes to the business environment have made the 
CBIT as originally proposed unworkable. In particular, there is substantial pressure for 
the U.S. to make its business tax rate more competitive with the rates in effect in other 
OECD countries. Therefore, it is not feasible to peg the CBIT rate at the maximum 
individual rate. Additionally, known fiscal commitments would make it difficult to forgo 
all taxes on distributions even if entity-level rates did not drop. Finally, top individual 
rates have moved substantially above top corporate rates, meaning that even in the 
absence of a drop in rates at the entity level, a substantial tax incentive for earnings 
retention has arisen. 
The Proposal represents an effort to address these developments while preserving 
the principal and quite substantial benefits the CBIT would confer. The main 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University Law School. Thanks to Reuven Avi-
Yonah, Mark Gergen, Jim Hines, Brad Joondeph, Ed Kleinbard and Dan Shaviro for suggestions 
and for comments on drafts of the underlying Special Report. 
1 “Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the Individual and 
Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Once,” Jan. 1992. The Report is available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/integration-paper.aspx#summary. 
 2 
modification is the addition of a tax on distributions and capital gains for high earners. 
However, unlike the business income tax itself, which would remain a tax on income, the 
distribution tax would operate as a cash-flow consumption tax on distributees. It would 
be implemented by means of a tax on distributions to high earners, offset by a 
corresponding deduction for distributions timely reinvested. 
Such a dual-track system would address many of the problems that have long 
beset the taxation of business income, yet it would have comparatively minor structural 
effects on other areas of the tax law, including in particular the taxation of cross-border 
investment, whether of U.S. persons abroad or of non-U.S. persons in U.S.-based 
activities. In addition to the efficiencies described above, it would result in substantial 
simplification, permitting the repeal of much of Subchapter C and virtually all of 
Subchapters K and S. Its principal detriment (from the point of view, at least, of a 
normative income tax) would be the conversion of part of the income tax on high earners 
to a consumption tax. As explained below and argued in greater detail in the Special 
Report, the objections to a shift to explicit consumption taxation solely for such 
distributions do not appear to be persuasive. 
Part I of this Executive Summary lays out the Proposal, Part II discusses 
incentive effects, Part III touches briefly on international aspects, Part IV examines 
revenue effects, and Part V replies to anticipated objections. 
I. The Proposal 
The principal reform recommendations are as follows: 
1. Replace the tax on corporate income with a flat tax on net business income, 
imposed without regard to the form in which the business is conducted. Sole 
proprietorships would be included. Thirty percent is a almost certainly at 
least revenue-neutral and likely revenue-positive when compared against 
2011 law (the most recent year for which revenue figures are available). 
2. Eliminate the deduction for interest paid by businesses subject to CBIT. 
3. Eliminate targeted business tax incentives and preferences such as 
accelerated depreciation, deductions for start-up costs and other business tax 
expenditures. 
4. Replace the tax on interest and dividends received from CBIT entities with a 
grossed-up tax on distributions (dividends or interest) to individuals, but only 
to the extent their marginal tax bracket exceeds the CBIT rate. Distributions 
to distributees in lower brackets would be tax-free. The gross-up would 
ensure that entity-level income is taxed at the full marginal rate applicable to 
individuals in marginal brackets above the CBIT rate (disregarding the time-
value benefit of delays in personal spending). Gross-up rates of 7.1 and 13.7 
percent correspond to overall rates of 35 and 39.6 percent. 
5. Apply the same grossed-up taxes on high earners on gains from the sale or 
exchange of CBIT equity interests or debt instruments issued by CBIT 
entities. 
6. Provide an above-the-line deduction to individuals to the extent amounts 
received subject to the tax on distributions or gains from sale or exchange are 
reinvested within one year of distribution (or within some other specified 
period). 
7. Repeal the withholding taxes on interest and dividends paid to non-U.S. 
persons. 
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8. Adopt, in some cases in modified form, the other recommendations made in 
the Treasury Report necessary to implement the CBIT, including in particular 
the transition rules.2 
If adopted as proposed, the overall effect would be to tax business income at a 
rate that is roughly comparable to that imposed by many OECD countries. (As of 2012, 
nominal national corporate tax rates in OECD countries ranged from 8.5 percent 
(Switzerland) to 35 percent (U.S.).3) The denial of the deduction for interest expense 
would make the tax law neutral between debt and equity as a choice for business finance. 
Persons in marginal tax brackets not above the entity bracket would not be subject to 
direct tax on business earnings: Because creditors and equity holders are taxed on interest 
and dividends, respectively, only to the extent their marginal rate exceeds the entity rate, 
the CBIT operates as a withholding tax and not in addition to the regular individual 
income tax. Similarly, reporting allocable interest expense to non-U.S. creditors provides 
an easy mechanism by which foreign jurisdictions that tax on a residence basis can treat 
the denial of the interest deduction as a creditable withholding tax. The imposition of a 
surtax on distributions is designed to preserve much of the progressivity of the income 
tax and to provide for adequate revenue while maintaining international competitiveness. 
Permitting a deduction for distributions otherwise subject to the surtax on amounts timely 
reinvested converts the tax on distributions (but not the entity-level tax) to a consumption 
tax for amounts received to the extent the distributee’s marginal rate exceeds the CBIT 
rate. The purpose of this reform is to discourage tax-motivated entity-level retention of 
earnings. 
II. Incentive Effects 
The principal advantages of the CBIT as originally proposed were that it 
eliminated the tax biases against the corporate form and in favor of debt finance, and that 
it provided for dramatic simplification by permitting the repeal of subchapters S and K 
and of the rules on distributions from C corporations. In addition, if Congress were to 
follow Treasury’s companion recommendation that business tax expenditures be 
dramatically curtailed, efficiencies in business activity and further simplification would 
be realized. 
The Proposal preserves these benefits (except for the full simplification of 
distribution taxes) and, in addition, addresses the problem of tax-motivated earnings 
retention. This problem has resurfaced as top marginal rates have recently moved 
substantially above top corporate rates and is likely to become worse in the absence of 
explicit relief, because of the pressure to lower entity-level rates. By providing for 
consumption tax treatment on taxes that would apply to distributions, the tax incentive to 
retain earnings is largely eliminated. In contrast to the original CBIT, the rules for 
distributions cannot be eliminated under the Proposal, because of the need to retain a tax 
on distributions to higher-bracket individuals. 
III. International Aspects 
The Proposal generally follows Treasury’s recommendation to separate business 
tax reform from other areas of tax reform, to the extent possible. Accordingly, no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See generally Treasury Report, 43-60. 
3 OECD, “2012 Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income,” col. 1.: “Central government 
corporate income tax rate.” 
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recommendations are offered regarding whether or how the U.S. international tax rules 
should be amended, except to the extent necessary to ensure that the basic objectives of 
the Proposal are realized. However, because one of the Proposal’s objectives is to enable 
Congress to maintain a competitive tax rate on foreign-source business income of U.S. 
persons, the Proposal departs from Treasury’s recommendation to leave intact the double-
tax treatment of foreign-source income of U.S. persons (albeit with an ordering rule, 
under the original CBIT, on distributions that would have ameliorated the double tax to 
some extent4). Instead, foreign income taxes paid would be treated as creditable for all 
CBIT purposes, assuming the existing rules on foreign-source income remain largely 
unchanged (or become more residence-based than they currently are). Alternatively, if 
the U.S. system becomes more territorial in nature, the Proposal advocates treating 
foreign taxes paid as a full substitute for the CBIT, assuming the amount of foreign taxes 
paid otherwise satisfies the requirements for exemption from U.S. tax at the entity level. 
Other changes to the international tax rules that Treasury recommended are 
carried over. These include the repeal of the withholding tax on dividend and non-
portfolio interest payments to non-U.S. persons and the extension of the availability of 
the indirect, or deemed, foreign tax credit to all CBIT entities otherwise meeting the 
ownership requirements for the credit. 
IV. Revenue Effects 
The Special Report does not provide a revenue estimate. It does, however, 
attempt to show that under conservative assumptions, a CBIT rate of 30 percent on a 
clean business tax base with distribution taxes of 7.1 and 13.7 percent on taxpayers 
currently in, respectively, the 35 and 39.6 percent brackets (subject to deduction if timely 
reinvested) is almost certainly revenue-neutral when compared against a baseline of 2011 
law and likely revenue-positive against that baseline. The conservative assumptions 
include: 
• that Congress provides relief to lower-bracket distributees of dividends and 
interest through a credit for the CBIT paid; 
• that the elimination of both interest inclusions and interest deductions is 
revenue-neutral rather than revenue-positive, despite the substantial tax 
incentive for borrowing; and 
• that Congress takes no steps to ameliorate base erosion and profit-shifting 
activities of U.S. multinationals. 
If these assumptions were relaxed, a revenue-neutral rate in the mid-20 percent 
range may be attainable.5 
V. Reply to Objections 
This section briefly addresses two anticipated objections to the Proposal: first, 
that the adoption of consumption-tax treatment on distributions to high earners is 
inconsistent with the U.S. income tax, and second, that the Proposal will be regressive 
with respect to income because it will tax all business income at a flat rate of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Treasury Report, at 55. 
5 Revenue neutrality is assumed solely for purposes of determining the feasibility of the 
Proposal, not for purposes of determining the proper CBIT and distribution rates. In light of 
known and expected future spending commitments, revenue increases will almost certainly be 
necessary. 
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approximately 30 percent, even if that income would be taxed at a lower rate under 
current law. Both objections are addressed in greater detail in the Special Report. 
A. Partial Consumption Taxation 
In the following discussion, it is important to bear in mind that the consumption 
tax treatment advocated in the Proposal applies only to the tax that will apply on 
distributions (whether of interest or dividends) to high-bracket distributees. The CBIT 
itself remains a tax on income. By offering a deduction against the distribution tax for 
distributions that are timely reinvested, the Proposal defers tax on distributions (to the 
extent otherwise taxable) until they are drawn down for consumption. The overall effect 
is to apply consumption taxation to what amounts to a surtax on distributions for high-
bracket taxpayers. Such an arrangement may seem incongruous in the context of what 
otherwise appears to be a system of income, not consumption, taxation. 
However, as noted in the Special Report, the current tax system already contains 
a number of consumption tax features and is more properly characterized as a hybrid 
income-consumption tax than an income tax. These features include the realization rule, 
or the principle that capital gains and losses generally are not subject to tax until they are 
disposed of; the availability of retirement and other deferred compensation vehicles that 
operate under explicit consumption tax treatment; and the taxation of owner-occupied 
housing. The addition of another consumption tax element (to the limited extent it 
replaces an element that operates as an income tax) merely moves the system further in 
the direction of consumption taxation; it does not transform an otherwise “pure” income 
tax system into a hybrid system. 
Secondly, because of the elasticity under current law of earnings distributions in 
closely-held entities to distribution taxes and because of clientele effects in the case of the 
ownership of large, publicly-traded corporations, consumption taxation already is in 
effect for most entity-level earnings to the extent a distribution tax applies to them. In 
particular, closely-held “C” corporations can defer distributions until such time as their 
owners wish to use the distributions for consumption, while investors in publicly-held 
corporations can choose to invest in “growth” stock rather than dividend-paying stock if 
they are tax-sensitive to distributions; for these investors, the cash-out occurs in the form 
of a sale of stock rather than a tax-timed distribution, again when it is time to consume. 
To the extent this description of investor and firm behavior applies to existing 
distribution decisions and ownership choices, consumption taxation already is in effect, 
and the shift to explicit consumption taxation of distributions amounts to a shift in the 
conditions under which consumption tax applies rather than a shift in the tax base: In 
place of consumption taxation of distributions at the price of inefficient earnings 
retention, the same consumption taxation applies, but without inefficient trapping of 
earnings in the entity in which they arise. 
Finally, it is not clear that there is anything amiss with consumption taxation, or 
at least partial consumption taxation, especially when adopted in the form recommended 
here. The usual objections to consumption taxation are that it is regressive and that it is 
incapable of generating adequate revenue. In light of the fact that consumption taxation 
effectively applies already to most otherwise taxable distributions, the revenue concern 
should be minimal. Further, the distribution tax applies only to high-income individuals. 
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B. Potential Regressivity 
The Proposal assumes a flat rate of 30 percent on business income. Thirty percent 
would represent an increase for taxable units currently in lower brackets that earn 
business income either directly or through a pass-through entity. However, Congress 
could ameliorate the effect by providing a credit for lower-bracket owners against their 
personal taxes, and, indeed, the Special Report assumes Congress does provide such a 
credit for purposes of analyzing revenue effects. Even with such a credit, a 30 percent 
CBIT rate seems easily within reach without loss of revenue (when compared against a 
2011 baseline), and a lower rate may well be within reach even on these assumptions. 
Further study would be required to make a proper revenue estimate. 
Even if Congress chooses not to provide relief through a credit, the progressivity 
effects of a 30 percent CBIT would be unclear. They depend not only on average 
effective tax rates but also on the use of tax revenues and on the allocative effects of 
adopting the Proposal. As regards the former, if outlays are adjusted so that increased 
revenue is returned to lower-bracket individuals through spending programs (whether 
direct or indirect), the overall effect would not be to reduce progressivity. As regards 
allocative effects, if adoption of the Proposal increases opportunities for persons currently 
in lower brackets to generate income, the nominal reduction in progressivity may be 
ameliorated or overcome by real, after-tax income growth for low-bracket businesses. 
Conclusion 
Three considerations will be of particular concern to Congress as it considers 
major business tax reform: 1. maintaining or enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. 
businesses and of the U.S. as a favorable investment environment; 2. simplification; and 
3. meeting revenue commitments. The Proposal is designed to address all three. By 
keeping business-level rates low, it improves the position of both U.S. business and the 
U.S. itself as a market for foreign investors. By eliminating much of the complexity in 
existing law, the Proposal dramatically reduces compliance and administrative costs; and 
by providing for a tax on distributions to higher-income taxpayers, the Proposal preserves 
the ability of the system to raise adequate revenue. 
In addition, the Proposal dramatically enhances efficiency in that it removes the 
three main tax-motivated biases that infect the current system of business taxation: the 
bias against the corporate form, the bias in favor of debt finance, and the bias in favor of 
earnings retention. Further efficiencies and simplification would be realized to the extent 
Congress repeals base-narrowing business tax incentives. 
